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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Inventors in America long lived with the risk that others could copy and profit off
an invention during the interim period when their patent application was pending at the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Even after inventors received their
patent, they were unable to get compensation for any infringing uses that occurred prior
to the patent issue date. With an ever-expanding backlog at the USPTO and the
corresponding increase in the time it takes for an application to be examined, this
unprotected period potentially cost inventors significant losses. Additionally, contrary to
the purpose of patent laws “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”1
inventors were incentivized to keep an invention secret from the public until their patent
issued.
In the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), Congress gave patent
applicants provisional rights in their published patent applications under 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(d).2 Prior to the passage of the AIPA in 1999, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, affirming its earlier decisions, had held that a patentee “may of course obtain
damages only for acts of infringement after the issuance of the . . . patent.”3 However,
the AIPA provided damages for infringement in the period before a patent applicant is
granted a patent.4 Provisional rights, also known as pre-issuance royalties, provide a
patentee with the prospect of obtaining a reasonable royalty from a third party that
infringes a published application claim. This right is provided only if the third party has
actual notice of the application and a patent issues from the application with a
substantially identical claim.5
The Federal Circuit has not had the opportunity to interpret the “substantially
identical” and “actual notice” requirements under § 154(d), but several district courts
have done so.6 At first glance, the district court rulings appear to be conflicting.
However, this Comment explains how the rulings are actually consistent, with each one
adding a slightly different layer to the interpretation of § 154(d). Currently, the various

*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, 2012. Thanks to my parents,
Syed and Zeba, and my brother, Sunny, for their support and guidance.
1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2006).
3
Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
4
Id.
5
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)–(2).
6
However, the language found in § 154(d) runs parallel to that found in § 252, which allows a reissued
patent to have retrospective power when the reissued claims are “substantially identical” to those in the
original patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 252. There are several Federal Circuit cases, decided before Congress
passed § 154(d), that provide some guidance for interpreting “substantially identical.”
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rulings addressing the actual notice requirement have not only ruled out constructive
notice but also indicate that direct notification action by the patentee is not a necessary
condition. It is sufficient if the alleged infringer knew about the patent application
through other channels. Other rulings indicate that when patentees do take direct actions
to notify, they cannot conceal the notification among other documents, although they do
not have to point out the infringement of specific claims.
The cases addressing the substantially identical requirement emphasize that each
claim amendment should be evaluated carefully to see if it changes the scope of the claim
and that not all claim amendments preclude a finding that claims are substantially
identical, even those that are in response to USPTO rejections. These cases suggest that
narrowing amendments can preclude a finding that claims are substantially identical, and
such an interpretation, when considered in combination with an earlier Federal Circuit
decision that arguably expands the definition of narrowing amendments, could severely
limit the application of § 154(d). This Comment first explores the different rulings,
reconciles them, and suggests that the Federal Circuit should consolidate the rulings from
the district courts into one binding decision that will provide greater certainty to litigants.
This Comment also explores the potential implications of the suggested decision.
Although the few district courts that have addressed these issues so far have
produced reasonable results, their rulings are not binding. This Comment recommends
that the Federal Circuit, when given the chance to review a case where § 154(d)
provisional rights are disputed, provide a decision consolidating the reasonable
interpretations applied by the various district court rulings up to this point. Otherwise,
there is a risk that other district courts may produce undesirable interpretations. Forum
shopping is very common in patent cases and infringers might find courts that take the
interpretation in a direction that weakens the protection promised to inventors. Such
uncertainty about the application of § 154(d) could conflict with Congress’s intent to
provide protection for inventors and could increase overall litigation costs.
II. PROVISIONAL RIGHTS

¶6

¶7

The AIPA requires that the USPTO publish utility patent applications eighteen
months after the earliest effective filing date or priority date claimed by an application.
Once it is published, the patent application can be viewed in its entirety by anyone who
requests to do so.7 However, subject to minimal limitations, an applicant may request
that the application not be published.8 Patent applicants are also allowed to rescind
nonpublication requests at any time.9
Before Congress passed the AIPA, damages for patent infringement were generally
available only for the time period after a patent’s issuance. However, Congress gave
patent applicants provisional rights in their published patent applications as an incentive
to publish, so that information about new advances could be shared with the public
regardless of whether a patent issues from an application.10 Congress also intended this
7
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PATENTS 11 (2011),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.pdf.
8
Id.
9
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(ii).
10
See Patrick J. Birde & Nicholas J. Nowak, 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) Grants Patent Applicants Provisional
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to serve as a check on those who may abuse the pre-grant publication system by copying
inventions before a patent’s issuance.11 After publication, an applicant may assert
provisional rights under § 154(d).12
Generally, damages are only available after the USPTO issues a patent to an
applicant. Provisional rights are an exception to this general rule under § 154(d). These
rights allow a patentee to obtain a reasonable royalty from one who infringed upon the
invention as claimed in the published patent application, between the date on which the
application was published and the date of the patent’s issuance.13
III. DEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROVISIONAL RIGHTS

¶9

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not explicitly addressed the issue
of provisional rights, a patentee’s right to pre-issuance royalties. This right is established
when an infringer has actual notice of the patent application publication and the claims in
the issued patent and the published patent publication are substantially identical. The
Federal Circuit has not provided clarification with respect to either the actual notice or
substantially identical requirements under § 154(d).14 However, the district courts in KTEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp.,15 First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc.,16 and Arendi Holding
Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,17 addressed provisional rights stemming from published patent
applications and gave some clarification on the actual notice requirement. These cases
indicate that constructive notice is not sufficient, but that direct notification by a patentee
is sufficient (though not necessary) if the alleged infringer knew about the patent
application through other means. Other rulings indicate that when patentees take direct
action, they do not have to specifically point out the infringement. However, they cannot
conceal the notification among other documents.
¶10
K-TEC and Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC also provide some guidance
for the substantially identical requirement.18 This guidance has interesting implications
when read in combination with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Honeywell International
Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.19 The district court cases emphasize that the impact
of each claim amendment on the scope of the claim should be carefully evaluated and
that not all claim amendments preclude a finding that claims are substantially identical—
Rights in Their Published Patent Applications, KENYON & KENYON INTELL. PROP. L.,
http://www.kenyon.com/media/~/media/Files/Publication%20PDFs/2003-09-01_Rights.ashx (last visited
June 5, 2012).
11
Id.
12
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 7.
13
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)–(2) (“[A] patent shall include the right to obtain a reasonable royalty from
any person who . . . makes, uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United States the invention as claimed in the
published patent application or imports such an invention into the United States; . . . and (B) had actual
notice of the published patent application. . . . The right . . . to obtain a reasonable royalty shall not be
available under this subsection unless the invention as claimed in the patent is substantially identical to the
invention as claimed in the published patent application.”).
14
See supra note 6.
15
No. 2:06-CV-108-TC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *1 (D. Utah May 24, 2010).
16
No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70482, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 17, 2008).
17
No. 09-119-JJF-LPS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27020, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 22, 2010).
18
See K-TEC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *1; Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB06-600, 2008 WL 3307156, at *9 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2008).
19
370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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even those that are in response to USPTO rejections. The district courts further suggest
that narrowing amendments can preclude a finding of substantially identical claims. This
reasoning, when considered in light of the Federal Circuit’s Honeywell decision possibly
expanding the definition of narrowing amendments, could severely limit the application
of § 154(d).
¶11
In K-TEC, while considering a motion for summary judgment, the District Court of
Utah ruled that recovering pre-issuance reasonable royalties under § 154(d) requires the
plaintiff to show that (1) the alleged infringer had actual notice of the patent application
and (2) that the claims of the patent application are substantially identical.20 In Arendi,
the Federal District Court for the District of Delaware laid out requirements similar to
those presented in K-TEC.21 Therefore, the patentee’s right to pre-issuance royalties is
established when an infringer has actual notice of the patent application publication and
the claims in the issued patent and the published patent publication are substantially
identical.
A. Defining the “Actual Notice” Requirement
¶12

In Arendi, the alleged notice was included among thousands of documents
produced in another litigation action between the same parties.22 In First Years, the
plaintiff had evidence that its counsel sent a letter to the defendant specifically
identifying the applications at issue.23 In K-TEC, the patentee had taken no steps to
inform the alleged infringer of the patent application, but the alleged infringer was
monitoring the application on its own.
1. Arendi’s Interpretation of “Actual Notice”

¶13

The plaintiff in Arendi filed a patent infringement suit against Microsoft Corp. and
Dell Inc. in the District of Delaware for infringement of its patent.24 Arendi sought preissuance damages by asserting provisional rights under § 154(d).25
¶14
The parties cited the same House Report, each arguing that the legislative history of
§ 154(d) supported their position.26 The House Report states:
The requirement of actual notice is critical. The mere fact that the published
application is included in a commercial database where it might be found is
insufficient. The published applicant must give actual notice of the published
application to the accused infringer and explain what acts are regarded as giving
rise to provisional rights.27

20

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *21–22 (citations omitted).
Arendi Holding Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 09-119-JJF-LPS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27020 (D. Del.
Mar. 22, 2010).
22
Id. at *21.
23
First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70482, at *3 (W.D.
Wis. Sept. 17, 2008).
24
Arendi, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27020, at *2.
25
Id.
26
Id. at *18–19.
27
H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, pt. 1, at 55 (1999).
21
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In a motion for summary judgment ruling that denied Arendi provisional damages, the
court held that the plain language of § 154(d) does not require “that the patent applicant
take an affirmative act to provide such notice to the alleged infringer (if the applicant can
prove that the alleged infringer came to have actual notice through some other means).”28
Although this would appear to help Arendi’s case at first glance, the court added:
It is not enough that the alleged infringer had information from which it could or
should have become aware of the existence of the published patent application
. . . “[t]he mere fact that the published application is included in a commercial
database where it might be found is insufficient.”29

The Arendi court explicitly dismissed the arguments for a direct notification requirement
based on legislative history indicating that Congress intended for the patentee to provide
notice to the alleged infringer.30 However, under the facts of this case, providing the
notice of publication for the application and related documents among thousands of other
documents was not enough to establish actual notice.31
2. First Years’s Interpretation of “Actual Notice”
¶15

First Years presented a different scenario from Arendi. The plaintiff filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against Munchkin, Inc. for
patent infringement and sought pre-issuance damages by asserting provisional rights
under § 154(d).32 Munchkin filed a motion to dismiss.33
¶16
Plaintiffs asserted that they had provided actual notice of the published patent
application because they had evidence that their counsel sent a letter to Munchkin
bringing Munchkin’s attention to the published patent application and indicating that
copies of the patent application were included. Munchkin contended that there was
inadequate evidence that it had actual notice.34 The defendant argued that if identifying a
patent later found to be infringing is not sufficient to be entitled to infringement damages
under § 287(a), then simply identifying a patent application should not be sufficient to be
entitled to damages under § 154(d).35
¶17
In denying Munchkin’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for pre-issuance
damages under § 154(d), the court ruled that, in cases of direct notification by the
patentee, notice of the published patent application by calling attention to it in a letter is
sufficient under § 154(d).36 The court further stated that, unlike § 287(a), “there is no
requirement that a patentee provide notice of the specific manner by which a defendant is
believed to be practicing the inventions claimed in a patent application.”37
28

Arendi, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27020, at *23.
Id. at *28 (second alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, at 55).
30
Id. at *5.
31
Id. at *32.
32
First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70482 (W.D. Wis.
Sept. 17, 2008).
33
Id. at *3.
34
Id. at *4.
35
Id. at *4–5.
36
Id. at *3–5.
37
Id. at *5.
29
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3. K-TEC’s Interpretation of “Actual Notice”
¶18

The plaintiff in K-TEC filed suit against Vita-Mix Corp. for patent infringement
and sought pre-issuance damages by asserting provisional rights under § 154(d).38 The
defendant argued “that K-TEC [wa]s not entitled to provisional rights because . . . the
claims of the [] published application [we]re not substantially identical to the claims of
the [issued] patent; and [because] K-TEC ha[d] no evidence of the amount of preissuance royalty damages it claim[ed] to have suffered.”39 In dismissing Vita-Mix’s
motion for summary judgment, the court, citing Arendi, ruled that “[a]lthough written
notice [from patentee to alleged infringer] is certainly sufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirement, the court does not read the statute’s plain language to be so limited.”40 It
held that a narrow interpretation, requiring the notice to take the form of a direct
notification from patentee, was unpersuasive.41 The court ruled that “[a] reasonable jury
could find that [the alleged infringer] was actually aware of the [] publication at some
point before the [] patent was issued” based on evidence in the form of e-mails showing
that they “monitored the application which matured to the [issued] patent.”42 Thus,
actual notice can be met if the alleged infringer knew of the published application
through other means even without any direct involvement of the patentee.
4. Reconciling Arendi’s, First Years’s, and K-TEC’s Interpretations of “Actual Notice”

¶19

In First Years, the court ruled that a letter identifying the published application was
sufficient for actual notice.43 However, in Arendi, the court ruled that simply providing
the notice of publication for the application and related documents among thousands of
other documents was not enough to establish actual notice.44 The Arendi court
distinguished the case from First Years on the ground that, unlike First Years, the
documents related to the published patent application in Arendi were sent with thousands
of other documents and the cover letter made no mention of the patent application.45 In
contrast to Arendi and First Years, K-TEC shows that actual notice can be met even
without any direct involvement or any direct action by the patentee.46
¶20
Thus, a patentee’s direct notification of an alleged infringer has been considered
sufficient to establish actual notice when it simply identifies the patent application and
calls attention to it but does not identify the specific infringing action. However, simply
including a notice of publication of an application (and related documents) along with
thousands of other documents without mentioning it in the cover letter was insufficient.
The presence of the published application in a commercial database where it may be
38

K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., No. 2:06-CV-108-TC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *4, *20 (D.
Utah May 24, 2010).
39
Id. at *20–23 (citations omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(B) (2006)).
40
Id. at *23.
41
Id.
42
Id. at *24.
43
First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70482 (W.D. Wis.
Sept. 17, 2008).
44
Arendi Holding Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 09-119-JJF-LPS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27020, at *29–
31 (D. Del. Mar. 22, 2010).
45
Id.
46
See K-TEC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858.
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found is also insufficient. It is also important to note district courts’ interpretations of the
differences between actual notice for provisional rights under § 154(d), covering the time
period between the publication date and the issue date of a patent and the notice
requirement under § 287(a) for damages covering the time period after a patent issues. It
is not enough for a patentee to simply identify a patent later found to be infringing to
receive damages under § 287(a); the patentee must identify the act of infringement.
However, under § 154(d), there is no requirement to specifically identify the
infringement; identifying the published application is enough, as long as it is not hidden
among thousands of other documents. Notice can be met if the alleged infringer knew of
the published application through other means even without any direct involvement of the
patentee.
5. Implications of the Actual Notice Requirement for Provisional Rights
¶21

One obvious question that arises after looking at K-TEC’s interpretation of actual
notice is whether companies should be tracking a competitor’s patent portfolio. It has
been common practice for companies to track their competitors’ patent portfolios to be
aware of competing products and any potential for patent infringement disputes. In light
of K-TEC, one must consider the potential pros and cons of such a decision. Since an
action for infringement or provisional rights cannot be brought until the patent issues, this
gives people time to redesign around and prepare ahead of time for potential issues with
competitors’ patents. Therefore, tracking pending patent applications may help in
avoiding damages later by taking measures before the patent issues. On the other hand,
records that come out during discovery could show that the defendant was aware of the
application. Evidence of such tracking can then be used to establish actual notice and get
reasonable royalties for the pre-issue period.
¶22
The decision whether to track patent applications is further complicated by the fact
that provisional rights depend on the claims being substantially identical in the
application and the issued patent. There is no way to predict with certainty which
applications will issue as patents with substantially identical claims. Therefore, a patent
holder tracking their competitor’s patent applications would be assuming the risk of
having to pay reasonable royalties for a period before the patent issues, if that application
issues as a patent with substantially identical claims and their product reads upon those
claims. Although this may seem unduly harsh, it fits with Congress’s purpose for
providing provisional rights. Congress intended to dissuade people from taking
advantage of the patent publication system by making the inventions described in the
patent application publications. Anyone whose invention comes within the scope of the
claims in the published application would have the incentive to either cease their
infringing activity or provide valid prior art to the USPTO so that the application’s claims
have to be amended.
¶23
Inventors with patent publications also face a difficult decision when deciding
whether or not to provide notice of their patent publications to other parties. The obvious
advantage is that the patent publication owners would get the chance to collect damages
for a longer period of time since they can establish actual notice for provisional rights by
giving such notice. However, the disadvantage is that, following publication, the
application for patent is no longer held in confidence by the USPTO and anyone may
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request access to the entire file history of the application. A competitor can then submit
prior art against an issued patent or pending patent application to the USPTO.
¶24
Such submissions can occur in several ways: (1) third-party submissions in patent
applications,47 (2) protests against published applications,48 and (3) citation of prior art in
issued patents.49 Third-party submissions in patent applications and protests against
published applications are the main tools a competitor would use against a published
application to either try to get the issuing claims to be no longer substantially identical, or
to prevent the patent from issuing altogether, thereby avoiding the reach of § 154(d).
However, this could backfire because if a competitor is submitting prior art under 37
C.F.R. § 1.99 or lodging a protest under 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 directed towards a specific
application, it is also potential evidence of actual notice of the application.
¶25
From the perspective of the inventor, prior art submissions could have positive or
negative effects on the patent application. Although the inventor wants the best patent
possible after all prior art is considered, prior art submitted by its competitors may result
in amended or narrower claims such that the inventor can no longer get pre-issuance
damages because the claims of the issued patent are no longer substantially identical to
those in the patent publication. Competitors could strategically turn in prior art to delay
the patent application. The prior art submissions may even result in complete denial of a
patent. Therefore, inventors must be very careful in deciding when to inform competitors
and potential infringers about patent publications. Since third-party submissions in patent
applications have to be made within two months of the publication date of a patent
application,50 it would be advisable for inventors to hold off on providing competitors
with information about the published patent application to minimize the chances that they
could interfere with the prosecution of that patent application.
B. Defining “Substantially Identical”
¶26

Under § 154(d), even after an infringer has actual notice of the patent application
publication, a patentee’s right to pre-issuance royalties is not established unless the
claims in the issued patent and the published patent publication are substantially
identical. Pandora and K-TEC clarify how claim amendments factor into the
determination of whether patented claims are substantially identical to the ones presented
in the published application.
47

37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2011). These submissions are “[s]ubmissions by the public of patents or
publications [made] only [d]uring the pendency of a published application.” Vincent LoTempio, “Patent
Pending” Provisional Rights, LOTEMPIO L. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2010),
http://www.lotempiolaw.com/2010/08/articles/patents/patent-pending-provisional-rights/. They “must be
filed within two months from the date of publication of the application (§ 1.215(a)) or prior to the mailing
of a notice of allowance (§ 1.311), whichever is earlier.” Id.
48
37 C.F.R. § 1.291. These protests may be filed by “[a]ny member of the public, including private
persons, corporate entities, and government agencies [i]n a pending patent application [and] [w]ill be
matched with [an] application file if [the protest] adequately identifies the patent application.” LoTempio,
supra note 47. In addition, “[a] protest has to be filed before publication or before a notice of allowance.”
Id.
49
37 C.F.R. § 1.501. In other words, “[a]ny person, individual, corporate or government entity, real
parties in interest, [or] persons without a real interest [m]ay submit patents or publications along with an
explanation [h]aving a bearing on the patentability of any claim in a particular patent.” LoTempio, supra
note 47.
50
37 C.F.R. § 1.99.
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1. Pandora’s Interpretation of “Substantially Identical”
¶27

In Pandora, the plaintiff filed a suit for patent infringement against Chamilia, LLC
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, claiming that Chamilia’s
jewelry literally infringed the provisional rights of its patent.51 The court held that the
claims were not substantially identical on the ground that Pandora made a narrowing
amendment by substantively amending the scope of a claim to overcome the USPTO’s
rejection of its patent application. As a result, the court held that “[b]ecause the issued
patent was not substantially identical to the published patent application, Pandora ha[d]
no provisional rights to assert.”52 Therefore, according to the Pandora ruling, a court
must determine whether the scope is the same and not just whether the words are
different. However, there are not many situations where changes made to rejected claims
to make them allowable would not be substantive changes.
2. K-TEC’s Interpretation of “Substantially Identical”

¶28

The plaintiff in K-TEC filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah
against Vita-Mix Corp. for patent infringement and sought pre-issuance damages by
asserting provisional rights under § 154(d).53 K-TEC was required to show that the
claims of Vita-Mix’s patent application were substantially identical to those in K-TEC’s
patent. In dismissing Vita-Mix’s motion for summary judgment, the court found the
patent prosecution history could support the conclusion that the two sets of claims were
substantially similar.54 Although there was an amendment made to the patent to secure
the patent from the USPTO, which “can preclude a finding that the claims are not [sic]
‘substantially similar,’ ‘there is no per se rule that an amendment to a claim in order to
overcome a [US]PTO rejection based on prior art precludes finding provisional rights.’”55
3. Reconciling K-TEC’s and Pandora’s Interpretations of “Substantially Identical”

¶29

Although the holdings are different, the takeaways from Pandora and K-TEC are
the same: Not all amendments to the claims result in a finding that the claims of the
published application and issued patent are not substantially identical. Even if the claim
amendments are in response to a rejection from the USPTO, they can still leave the
claims substantially identical unless the amendment narrows the scope of the claim.
Although there are few situations where changes made to rejected claims to make them
allowable would not be substantive changes, if the substance of the claims stays the same
(i.e., in situations where the claim amendments make the claims more definite or better
describe the same feature without narrowing it), they are still substantially identical.
Provisional rights are still available as long as the actual notice requirement is also met.
Therefore, in light of these two rulings, amendments that simply clarify the scope of the

51

Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-06-600, 2008 WL 3307156, at *9 (D. Md. Aug. 8,
2008).
52
Id. at *10.
53
K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., No. 2:06-CV-108-TC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51858, at *20–21 (D.
Utah May 24, 2010).
54
Id. at *24.
55
Id.
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claim language do not alter the claims substantially, and each claim amendment must be
evaluated carefully to gauge its impact on the scope of the claim.
IV. NARROWING AMENDMENTS AND HONEYWELL
¶30

Narrowing amendments can preclude a finding that the claims are substantially
identical, whereas amendments that make the claims more definite leave the claims
substantially identical. Thus, it is important to understand what kind of amendments
would be considered narrowing amendments. Typically, narrowing amendments would
require that the claim language be changed such that the new language encompasses less
(i.e., a smaller scope) than that of the previous claim. However, in certain situations,
amendments that leave some claims with the exact same language as in the original
published patent application can still arguably be considered narrowing amendments.
This may sound counterintuitive, but the Federal Circuit in an en banc opinion stated that
this is the case when dependent claims are written into independent form to get an
allowance.56
¶31
Judge Newman disagreed with this interpretation in her dissent, stating that
“[r]ewriting of a claim in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 can never be a narrowing
amendment, because, by statute, rewriting a dependent claim in independent form does
not narrow the claim’s scope. The Court did not purport to overturn that well-respected
law.”57 One must also keep in mind that the opinion was in the context of prosecution
history estoppel, which may later bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the
limitations contained in the dependent claim.58 However, the majority failed to endorse
Judge Newman’s position or even address it. Additionally, the majority did specifically
define such amendments as “narrowing amendments” and, when considered in
conjunction with the K-TEC and Pandora rulings, the decision could be used to argue
that narrowing amendments can preclude a finding that the claims are substantially
identical. The court’s failure to address this seemingly obvious conundrum is particularly
odd.
¶32
The court in Honeywell explained that rewriting a dependent claim in independent
form could be a narrowing amendment. It stated that “[a] presumption of surrender
therefore arises if rewriting the dependent claims into independent form, along with
canceling the original independent claims, constitutes a narrowing amendment.”59 Thus,
the court stated that rewriting a dependent claim in independent form could be a
narrowing amendment (although it was in the context of prosecution history estoppel
which may later bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the limitations
contained in the dependent claim). And the K-TEC and Pandora rulings indicate that
narrowing amendments can preclude a finding that the claims are substantially identical.
Combining the reasoning from Honeywell with the K-TEC and Pandora rulings supports
the argument that rewriting a dependent claim in independent form could preclude a
finding that the claims are substantially similar because the change could be a narrowing
amendment. Based on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Honeywell, one cannot
56

Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Id. at 1150 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 1140 (majority opinion).
59
Id. at 1141.
57
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automatically assume that claims in the issued patent are substantially similar to those in
the published application simply because they are the dependent claims with the exact
same language rewritten in independent form.
V. SUGGESTED INTERPRETATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
¶33

This Comment recommends that the Federal Circuit consolidate the reasonable
interpretations applied by the district courts in the rulings discussed in this Comment.
Some may argue that there is no need for the Federal Circuit to provide any guidance
because, as seen above, the district courts that have addressed these issues have so far
produced reasonable results. However, very few district courts have addressed § 154(d)
provisional rights and their rulings are not binding. If the Federal Circuit does not
provide binding precedent, there is a risk that other district courts may not be as
reasonable in their interpretations. Forum shopping is very common in patent cases and
in the absence of binding precedent, infringers could find courts willing to take the
interpretation in a different direction and weaken the protection promised to inventors.
Such uncertainty about the application of § 154(d) would defeat congressional intent in
providing protection to inventors and increase litigation costs.
¶34
For the specific issue raised by Honeywell and the overall interpretation of the
§ 154(d) requirements, this Comment recommends that the Federal Circuit focus on an
interpretation that helps achieve Congress’s goal of encouraging inventors to publish
their applications. Putting dependent claims into independent form is a very common
claim amendment. If the claims are no longer substantially identical after such
amendments, there would be very few instances where pre-issuance damages will apply
and provisional rights will not serve the intended purpose of incentivizing inventors to
publish their applications. There would be the potential for widespread misuse of the
patent publication system to produce applicants’ inventions from the published
applications during the period before the patent issues. With the long pendency periods
and existing backlog at the USPTO, inventors could be left without protection for a
substantial period of time and they may choose to avoid publication so that their
applications are kept confidential.
¶35
Therefore, the Federal Circuit should clarify that, for the purpose of determining
provisional rights, claims that are still substantially identical after amendment are not to
be considered narrowing amendments in situations where a dependent claim in the
published application was put into independent form in the issued patent. Additionally,
the Federal Circuit should affirm the reasoning from K-TEC and Pandora that not all
claim amendments preclude a finding that claims are substantially identical, even those
that are in response to USPTO rejections. The court should emphasize that each claim
amendment should be individually evaluated to determine its impact on the scope of the
claim.
¶36
With respect to the actual notice requirement, the Federal Circuit should issue an
opinion that confirms and combines the reasoning from K-TEC, First Years, and Arendi
to create a rule that will provide more certainty for potential litigants. Additionally, such
a move would provide binding precedent for the future and would prevent other district
courts from expanding or narrowing the impact of § 154(d) according to their whims.
The Federal Circuit should not only rule out constructive notice, but also establish that
direct notification action by patentee is not a necessary condition. The court should
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establish that it is sufficient if the alleged infringer knew about the patent application
through other means. The court should also establish requirements for direct notification
that are fair to both patentees and potential infringers. Patentees should not have to
specifically point out the infringement, but they also should not be able to conceal the
notification among other documents.
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